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I. INTRODUCTION
HE following is a discussion of significant personal tort cases de-
cided in Texas during the Survey period, November 1, 2007, to Oc-
tober 31, 2008. This discussion covers a wide variety of important
Texas tort issues, ranging from whether a commonly-used pattern jury
charge in products liability cases improperly defines legal terms to
whether a church member may bring an intentional tort action against a
church and its employees. Part II discusses a case that requires a change
to the pattern jury charge previously used in products liability actions
based on manufacturing defects. Additionally, Part II discusses recent
Texas Supreme Court cases clarifying the intersection of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) and Texas products liability law as well as the
non-liability of an auctioneer in a products action. Part III discusses the
supreme court's recent decision defining the contours of a church's liabil-
ity in a tort action.
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. PATTERN JURY CHARGE FOR MANUFACTURING DEFECT
AND PRODUCING CAUSE
On December 21, 2007, the Texas Supreme Court decided Ford Motor
Co. v. Ledesma,' a products liability action based on a manufacturing de-
fect. In Ledesma, the Texas Supreme Court made two significant rulings:
(1) that Texas's pattern jury charge commonly used in products liability
* University of Houston Law Center, George Butler Research Professor of Law.
My thanks to Lauren Schroeder, Christopher Dykes, and Paul Kim for their terrific re-
search assistance on this article.
1. 242 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2007).
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actions provided an incomplete, and therefore erroneous, definition of
"manufacturing defect"; and (2) that the frequently submitted definition
of "producing cause" used in the pattern jury charge was erroneous.2
In March of 1999, Tiburicio Ledesma purchased a new truck from de-
fendant Ford Motor Company. 3 A few months later, while driving the
car, Ledesma was involved in an accident in which his car struck two
parked cars.4 Inspection of the truck after the accident revealed that the
rear spring and axle assembly had separated, causing the drive shaft to
dislodge from the transmission.5 Ledesma sued defendant Ford Motor
Company for the damages he sustained, claiming that a manufacturing
defect in the truck caused the rear-axle displacement, thereby causing the
accident.6 In defense, Ford Motor Company claimed that the plaintiff's
poor driving caused the accident, thereby causing the rear axle to detach. 7
After a jury trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
awarding damages in excess of $200,000.8 Ford Motor Company ap-
pealed, claiming in part that the trial court improperly instructed the jury
on the definitions of "manufacturing defect" and "producing cause." 9
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed. 10 The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded the case for a new trial.1 ' In its ruling in favor of
defendant Ford Motor Company, the supreme court mandated at least
two changes to Texas's pattern jury charge.
There are at least two different types of product liability defects-de-
sign defects and manufacturing defects.12 A design defect is essentially a
claim that the defendant's product has been designed in such a manner as
to render it unreasonably dangerous.1 3 Accordingly, an alleged design
defect affects every product issued pursuant to that particular design, as it
is an attack on the entire line of a particular product. In contrast, a man-
ufacturing defect is a claim alleging that a particular item has been pro-
duced incorrectly and not pursuant to its intended design. 14 A claim
2. Id. at 35.
3. Id.
4. Id.




9. Id. at 41. Defendant Ford Motor Company also complained on appeal that the
trial court erred in admitting the testimony of two of the plaintiff's expert witnesses. Id. at
37. Ruling against Ford on this issue, the supreme court held that the testimony was suffi-
ciently reliable to warrant its admission. Id. at 39.
10. Id. at 36-37.
11. Id. at 35.
12. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (clas-
sifying product defects as either design, manufacturing, or warnings/instruction).
13. See, e.g., id. § 2(b) (defining design defect as a product designed in such a manner
as to render the product not reasonably safe).
14. See, e.g., id. § 2(a) (defining manufacturing defect as a product departing from its
intended design); see also Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex.
2006) (explaining that pursuant to Texas law, a manufacturing defect exists when a product
deviates from its specified or planned output that renders it unreasonably dangerous); Am.
Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 434 (Tex. 1997).
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based on a manufacturing defect is essentially a claim that the particular
item's deviation from its intended design has rendered that item unfit or
unreasonably dangerous. 15
In Ledesma, the plaintiff's theory at trial was that his truck contained a
manufacturing defect that led to his accident. 16 The plaintiff presented
expert testimony at trial seeking to prove that the truck's rear axle assem-
bly was constructed improperly and not pursuant to defendant Ford Mo-
tor Company's intended design. 17 The plaintiff's claim was that the
defendant had simply failed to construct the rear-tire assembly in the
manner required by its own specifications. 18 His claim was not an attack
against Ford's entire design (a design defect claim), but rather was a claim
that the particular truck he bought was improperly constructed (a manu-
facturing defect claim).
When the case was presented to the jury, the jury was asked over
Ford's timely objection to decide whether Ledesma's truck contained a
manufacturing defect that was a producing cause of Ledesma's accident. 19
The court instructed the jury:
A "defect" means a condition of the product that renders it unrea-
sonably dangerous. An "unreasonably dangerous" product is one
that is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary user of the product, with the ordinary knowl-
edge common to the community as to the product's characteristics. 20
The supreme court held that the instruction submitted to the jury was
incomplete and therefore an inaccurate explanation of a manufacturing
defect pursuant to Texas law.21
First, the supreme court explained that the instruction did not require
the jury to determine exactly how the defendant's product deviated from
its intended design.22 By omitting this determination, the supreme court
explained, the jury was never asked to consider whether the product was
in an unreasonably dangerous condition because of that deviation.23
Without that information, the basis upon which the jury concluded that
the product was in an unreasonably dangerous condition remains unclear.
This is problematic because, in Texas, distinguishing whether the product
was in an unreasonably dangerous condition because of a design defect or
based on a manufacturing defect is very important. 24 In Texas, liability
15. Am. Tobacco, 951 S.W.2d at 434.
16. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 41.
17. Id. at 37-38. The plaintiff's specific claim was that the u-bolts used in the rear tire
assembly were under-torqued and well below defendant Ford Motor Company's required
specifications. Id.
18. Id. at 38.
19. Id. at 41.








for a design defect requires proof of a safer alternative design.25
Because a products claim based on design defect essentially seeks a
determination that the product should have been planned and created
more safely,26 Texas requires proof that it could have been designed more
safely. Accordingly, Texas requires proof of the availability of a safer
alternative design. In contrast, a products action based on a manufactur-
ing defect merely alleges that something went wrong with the construc-
tion of the particular unit in question.27 Proof of an alternative available
design is therefore irrelevant. 28 In Ledesma's case, the failure to ask the
jury whether the product deviated from its intended design leaves to
speculation whether the jury found the product to contain a design defect
or a manufacturing defect. 29 This is problematic because if the unreason-
ably dangerous condition was based upon a design defect, the jury may
have imposed liability without considering whether a safer alternative de-
sign was available, as required by Texas law.30
In Ledesma, the supreme court correctly concluded that subjecting de-
fendant Ford Motor Company to liability without clarifying the basis of
its liability is improper. A jury must identify whether it is imposing liabil-
ity for a design defect or for a manufacturing defect. 31 To merely ask if a
product is in an unreasonably dangerous condition without more poten-
tially subjects a defendant to liability outside of the requirements of Texas
law.
In addition to the erroneous definition of a manufacturing defect, Ford
Motor Company also complained on appeal-and the supreme court
agreed-that the jury was improperly guided as to the definition of "pro-
ducing cause."'32 In its instruction to the jury, relying again on the pattern
jury charge, the trial court defined "producing cause" as: "an efficient,
exciting, or contributing cause that, in a natural sequence, produces the
incident in question. There may be more than one producing cause." 3
3
The supreme court criticized this definition because of its inability to pro-
vide "concrete guidance" to a jury,34 complaining that the terms "effi-
cient" and "exciting" were adjectives "foreign to modern English
language" as a means to describe legal cause and, as such, offer little
25. Id.
26. See generally David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 Mo. L. REV. 291, 297 (2008)
(examining design defectiveness as developed in the courts pursuant to Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability).
27. David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 53 S.C. L. REV. 851, 852 (2002) (examin-
ing manufacturing defects in products liability actions).
28. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 42.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Texas, like most jurisdictions, requires proof of a safer alternative design in order
to impose liability for a design defect. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD-
ucrs LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
32. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 45.
33. Id. at 41.
34. Id. at 46.
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practical guidance. 35 It held that Texas juries should be instructed that a
"producing cause" is one that must be: (1) "a substantial cause of the
event in issue"; and (2) "a but-for cause, namely one without which the
event would not have occurred." '3 6
The supreme court correctly ruled for a more helpful and insightful
manner to instruct juries. To tell the jury that a producing cause is one
that is "efficient" and "exciting" is to tell them close to nothing. Moreo-
ver, these terms are likely to be more confusing to juries than helpful.
The clearer the court can be in instructing juries, the better. Meaningful
definitions in plain English are much more instructive and desirable than
employing vague and flowery terms.
Ledesma is significant because it changes pattern jury instructions in
Texas in at least two respects: (1) by providing a more complete and accu-
rate definition of a manufacturing defect in products actions, and (2) by
providing a more useful and accurate definition of "producing cause."
Ledesma also serves as a helpful reminder to Texas practitioners that they
are wise not to blindly follow the pattern jury charges as definitive state-
ments of law. Despite the fact that courts of appeals have noted the
lower courts' reluctance to stray from the pattern jury charge instructions
for fear that the Texas Supreme Court will not approve, the Texas Su-
preme Court will not necessarily follow the mandates of the pattern jury
charge. In this case, the Texas Supreme Court's changes to the instruc-
tions were prudent and grounded in firmly established tort doctrine. 37
B. INTERSECTION OF UCC AND TORT LAW
On June 27, 2008, the Texas Supreme Court decided JCW Electronics,
Inc. v. Garza,38 a case that afforded the supreme court the opportunity to
consider the intersection between tort law, contract law, and principles of
comparative fault. In this interesting products liability action, the su-
preme court clarified the definition of "tort" as used in Texas's compara-
tive fault statute. 39 The supreme court ruled that "tort," as used in the
statute, included a breach of implied warranty claim, the strange child of
both contract and tort law. 40
In late 1999, Rolando Montez was arrested and jailed for public intoxi-
cation in Port Isabel, Texas. 41 The Port Isabel jail was equipped with tele-
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998); See also
Owen, supra note 25, at 291 (providing a thorough analysis of design defect theory in
products liability cases).
38. 257 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. 2008).
39. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(a)(1) (Vernon 2008) (providing
for apportionment of responsibility among responsible parties in "any cause of action
based on tort").
40. JCW, 257 S.W.3d at 702. See generally Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Contortions Along
the Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 457 (1994) (exploring the
interrelationships between contract and tort law).
41. JCW, 257 S.W.3d at 702.
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phones for inmate use manufactured by defendant JCW Electronics, Inc.
(JCW). 4 2 The day after his arrest, Montez used one of these phones to
call his mother and arrange bail.43 Unfortunately, on the day he was to
be released, Montez also used the cord from one of these phones to hang
himself.44 Montez's mother, Pearl Garza, sued the City of Port Isabel and
JCW alleging negligence, misrepresentation, and beach of implied war-
ranty for fitness.45 When asked to apportion fault among responsible
parties, the jury attributed sixty percent fault to Montez, twenty-five per-
cent to the City of Port Isabel, and fifteen percent to JCW.46 JCW ap-
pealed, complaining that the jury's attribution of sixty percent fault to
Montez barred JCW from liability based on Texas's apportionment of
fault scheme in products liability actions.47
Chapter 33 of Texas's Civil Practices and Remedies Code adopts a
comparative fault scheme in "any cause of action based on tort."48 Pur-
suant to the statute, "a claimant may not recover damages if his percent-
age of responsibility is greater than 50 percent."'49 JCW claimed that
because the jury attributed sixty percent of the fault to Montez, the dece-
dent for whose death the plaintiff was seeking recovery, the plaintiff here
was barred.
The heart of JCW's defense was that, in a products liability action,
Chapter 33's comparative fault scheme includes causes of action for
breach of implied warranty for fitness pursuant to Texas's equivalent to
Article 2 of the UCC. 50 The plaintiff's position was that such a claim is
not a tort action but more properly characterized as a contract action. 51
Plaintiff's argument continued that because a breach of warranty claim is
not a "tort," Chapter 33 was inapplicable, and the plaintiff was therefore
not barred from recovery. The court of appeals agreed with the plaintiff,





45. Id. at 702-03. The breach of warranty claim was based on the allegation that JCW
had represented to Port Isabel that the telephones were safe for unsupervised use by in-
mates. Id. at 703.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 702 (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(a)(1) (Vernon
2008)). See generally Mark E. Roszkowski & Robert A. Prentice, Reconciling Comparative
Negligence and Strict Liability: A Public Policy Analysis, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 19, 20 (1988)
(discussing the various policies underlying the reconciliation of comparative negligence
and strict liability doctrines).
49. JCW, 257 S.W.3d at 707 (quoting Act of May 8, 1995, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 136, § 1,
1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 971, 971 (current version at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 33.001 (Vernon 2008))). In a wrongful death action, such as the claim here, the statute
defines "claimant" as including not only the plaintiff, but the decedent as well. See TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.011(1).
50. JCW, 257 S.W.3d at 702 n.1 (citing TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.101-.725
(Vernon 1994)).
51. Id. at 704.
52. Id. at 708.
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The supreme court explained that a breach of warranty claim presents
a unique mixture of contract law and tort law. 53 JCW's position that the
plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty is in fact a tort is based on the
peculiar and uncertain character of a breach of warranty claim.54 Ac-
knowledging that a breach of implied warranty action may conceptually
be characterized either in contract or in tort,5 5 quoting Dean Prosser, the
supreme court explained that breach of warranty law is "'a freak hybrid
born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract."' 56 The supreme court
went on to explain that a breach of warranty action is created by opera-
tion of Texas common law and is "grounded more in tort than in con-
tract, '57 particularly where the damages sought are for recovery for
personal injuries. 58 Recovery for pure economic injuries is more akin to
a contract action. 59 Applying the law to the facts in this case, because the
plaintiff was seeking to recover for personal injuries, this action was prop-
erly characterized as a tort action. 60
Bolstering its conclusion further, the supreme court explained that the
legislature intended for a breach of warranty claim to be included within
Chapter 33's apportionment of fault scheme. 61 In this statute, the legisla-
ture left the term "tort" undefined. 62 However, the chapter expressly in-
cludes all products liability actions. 63 A breach of implied warranty claim
is just one type of products liability action.64 Therefore, the supreme
court concluded, such a claim was necessarily intended by the legislature
to be included as part of this chapter.65 Despite the plaintiff's assertions
that the UCC is intended in part to provide uniformity across the states
regarding the sale of goods, the supreme court explained that "UCC arti-
cle 2 does not undertake a comprehensive comparative fault scheme."'6 6
Therefore, the Texas legislature could and did properly intend for breach
of implied warranty products claims to be governed by Chapter 33. Thus,
comparative fault principles apply.67
53. Id. at 704-05 (quoting William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960)); see also Galligan, supra note
40, at 457, 461-62 (examining various issues that arise when contract law and tort law
intersect).
54. JCW, 257 S.W.3d at 704-05.
55. Id. at 704.
56. Id. (quoting Prosser, supra note 53, at 1126).
57. Id. (quoting La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex.
1984)).
58. Id. at 705.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 704. Because the incident in question in this case occurred in 1999, the 1995
version of Chapter 33 is the applicable apportionment of responsibility provision. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucrs LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
65. JCW, 257 S.W.3d at 704.
66. Id. at 706.
67. Id. at 706-07; see generally William J. McNichols, The Relevance of the Plaintiffs
Misconduct in Strict Tort Products Liability, the Advent of Comparative Responsibility, and
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 201, 204 (1994) (taking the
2009] 1371
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Concurring in the majority's opinion, Chief Justice Jefferson wrote sep-
arately, joined by Justice O'Neill.68 Agreeing with the majority's applica-
tion of the comparative fault scheme barring the plaintiff's recovery,
Chief Justice Jefferson took issue with the language of apportionment
questions generally submitted to Texas juries in similar cases. 69 He ex-
plained that courts should be careful to ask juries to apportion the par-
ties' percentage of responsibility rather than the percentage of
negligence.70 Chapter 33 requires the jury to apportion responsibility as
to each cause asserted:
'The trier of fact, as to each cause of action asserted, shall determine
the percentage of responsibility . . . with respect to each person's
causing or contributing to cause in any way the harm for which re-
covery of damages is sought, whether by negligent act or omission,
by any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other con-
duct or activity that violates an applicable legal standard, or by any
combination of these .... '71
Chief Justice Jefferson explained that Texas's comparative fault scheme
may apply, not only to negligence actions, but also to various theories of
recovery, even in the same case. 72 Accordingly, in such cases, the trial
court needs to be sure that the jury is asked what percentage of fault each
party is responsible for, regardless of the theory of recovery.73 Asking
the jury merely "[w]hat percentage of the negligence that caused the
death of the decedent" it finds to be attributable to each of the parties is
too narrow a question.74 Asking for apportionment of negligence fails to
require the jury to determine the percentage of fault attributable to the
defendant or defendants based on alternate, allowable theories of recov-
ery, such as the breach of warranty claim at issue here.
In this case, failing to ask the jury to apportion fault was immaterial to
the outcome because the jury apportioned sixty percent of the fault to
Montez's negligence. As long as the jury determined that Montez's negli-
gence was greater than fifty percent, the plaintiff was barred from recov-
ering from any of the defendants. 75 If the jury had assigned less than fifty
percent of the fault to Montez, the issue that Chief Justice Jefferson iden-
tified would have been problematic. If Montez's negligence had contrib-
uted less than fifty percent to the incident, the failure of the jury to
attribute fault to JCW for its breach of warranty would have made it im-
possible to calculate the amount of damages the plaintiff would have
position that applying comparative fault principles in strict liability products actions is justi-
fiable and appropriate).
68. JCW, 257 S.W.3d at 708 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring).
69. Id. at 710.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 709-10 (quoting TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.003 (Vernon
2008)).
72. Id. at 709.
73. Id. at 710 n.2.
74. Id. at 710.
75. Id. at 704 n.4.
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been entitled to recover. Under those circumstances, the case could have
been properly remanded to the trial court for further determination on
apportionment of responsibility.
Chief Justice Jefferson's concern is valid. Because Chapter 33 reflects a
comparative fault scheme rather than a comparative negligence scheme, 76
Texas trial courts should be careful with the language used to instruct
juries in apportioning responsibility.77
C. PRODucTs LIABILITY OF AUCTIONEER
On March 28, 2008, the Texas Supreme Court decided New Texas Auto
Services, L.P. v. Gomez de Hernandez and clarified that in a Texas prod-
ucts liability action, an auctioneer cannot be held liable for a defective
product.7 8 In October 2000, Jose Angel Hernandez Gonzalez bought a
1993 Ford Explorer from Progresso Motors, who had purchased it from
defendant Big H, an auctioneer temporarily holding title to the car.
79
About a year after purchasing the vehicle, Gonzalez was killed in a roll-
over accident while driving the car. Representatives of his estate sued the
car manufacturer, the tire manufacturer, Big H, and others for products
liability, claiming that the car had a defect that caused the accident in
which Gonzalez was killed.8 0 Big H's motion for summary judgment was
76. In 1987, Texas adopted a comparative fault scheme, moving away from common
law contributory negligence as a defense in negligence actions. At common law, the doc-
trine of contributory negligence operated to bar a plaintiff from recovery in a negligence
action if the plaintiff's own negligence contributed at all to the incident. Over the years,
this doctrine was much criticized as leading to harsh results, as it completely barred a plain-
tiff from recovery, even if the plaintiff was only minimally at fault. See Roszkowski &
Prentice, supra note 48, at 30-31 (describing the harshness of contributory negligence prior
to adoption of comparative fault principles). In response to this harshness, Texas-like
most other jurisdictions-has adopted some type of comparative fault scheme. See Mc-
Nichols, supra note 67, at 236-37 (explaining that the vast majority of jurisdictions apply
some type of comparative apportionment of responsibility in strict products liability ac-
tions); Roszkowski & Prentice, supra note 48, 44-45 (discussing Texas's adoption of a com-
parative causation system); see also Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 418
(Tex. 1984) (the preeminent Texas case in which the supreme court adopted comparative
fault principles); Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978) (the most influen-
tial case applying comparative fault principles to strict liability tort actions). Instead of
completely barring a plaintiff's recovery, a comparative fault scheme allows for a plaintiff's
recovery to be reduced according to the amount of fault attributable to the plaintiff. Many
of these comparative fault schemes bar a plaintiff from recovering if the plaintiff's fault
rises to a certain percentage. The percentage varies from state to state.
Although first adopted in the negligence context, many jurisdictions, like Texas, eventu-
ally extended the concept of comparative fault to other areas of tort law, including prod-
ucts liability actions, regardless of the theory. See William C. Powers, Jr., Annual Survey of
Texas Law Part I: Private Law Torts Personal, 38 Sw. L.J. 1, 10-16 (1984) (discussing com-
parative fault issues in products liability suits). Because comparative or apportionment of
responsibility may apply to theories of tort recovery in addition to negligence, "compara-
tive fault" or "apportionment of responsibility" are more appropriate terms to describe
this concept of weighing a plaintiff's fault against a defendant's fault to determine whether,
and how much, a plaintiff is entitled to recover.
77. See Roszkowski & Prentice, supra note 48, at 64-65 (explaining why the term "con-
tributory negligence" can be confusing in comparing fault in products actions).
78. 249 S.W.3d 400, 402 (Tex. 2008).
79. Id. at 402.
80. Id.
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granted at trial,81 and the court of appeals reversed. 82 In considering Big
H's appeal, the Texas Supreme Court was presented with the issue of
whether Big H could be held liable for products liability when Big H
served only as an auctioneer of the vehicle and was never the seller or
manufacturer of the car.83 On March 28, 2008, the supreme court ruled
that, as an auctioneer, Big H could not be held liable for a product's de-
fect.84 Reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court held that al-
though products liability law "requires those who place products in the
stream of commerce to stand behind them[,] it does not require everyone
who facilitates the stream to do the same."'8 5 Here, the supreme court
concluded that an auctioneer facilitates, but does not place products in,
the stream of commerce and therefore, cannot be held liable for a defec-
tive product. 86
The genesis of Texas products liability law is found in section 402A of
the Second Restatement of Torts.87 A defendant who sells a product in
an unreasonably dangerous defective condition may be held strictly liable
for physical injuries caused by that condition.8 8 From its inception, sec-
tion 402A has limited its scope to those "'engaged in the business of sell-
ing' such products.189 The question in this case was whether Big H, an
auctioneer of the allegedly defective vehicle, could be held to have placed
the product in the stream of commerce. 90 The court observed that strict
products liability is not only reserved for parties involved in selling the
product, but also for those involved in distributing the product.91 How-
ever, auctioneers are expressly excluded from liability.92 The supreme
court concluded that because Big H was not in the business of selling
automobiles, but rather in the business of announcing the sale of automo-
biles, Big H could not be held strictly liable for the injuries caused by this
allegedly defective product.93
This is an insightful opinion, not just because the supreme court prop-
erly relied on the birth and foundation of strict liability in Texas, but also
because of the supreme court's careful consideration of the policy issues







87. Id. at 402-03.
88. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
89. Id. at 403 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A).
90. Id. at 402-03. Big H was not in the business of selling cars but rather was in the
business of auctioning cars, a very relevant distinction when seeking to impose strict prod-
ucts liability. Big H worked as an agent of both the seller and the buyer, receiving a fee
from both for its auctioning services. See id. at 404.
91. Id. at 404 (citing the RESTATEMENT OF LAW (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 1 (1998)).
92. Id. (referring to the RESTATEMENT OF LAW (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 20 cmt. g (regarding commercial auctioneers)).
93. Id. at 405-06.
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ing injured consumers, (2) spreading potential losses, and (3) deterring
future injuries."'94 The supreme court explained:
Businesses that play only an incidental role in a product's placement
are rarely in a position to deter future injuries by changing a prod-
uct's design or warnings. If required to spread risks, they must do so
across far more products than the one that was defective. And while
many businesses may be able to pay compensation, consumers nor-
mally expect a product's manufacturer to be the one who stands be-
hind it.95
The supreme court's careful interpretation of the language of the law, as
well as the various policy issues at play, resulted in an opinion that cor-
rectly interprets, applies, and clarifies Texas law. It is important for
courts to revisit issues of policy as they make their determinations, as
such debate is useful in a thoughtful development of the law.
96
III. INTENTIONAL TORTFEASORS AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert,97 the Texas Supreme
Court considered whether the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause
98
and Texas's constitutional counterpart 99 shield a church, its staff, and its
members from liability for intentional torts committed against a church
member. The supreme court concluded, over strong dissent, that the First
Amendment and its Texas counterpart did in fact protect the church from
liability under the circumstances.1 00
In 1996, seventeen-year-old Laura Schubert attended church with her
family at Pleasant Glade Assembly of God.10 1 One weekend while her
parents were out of town, Laura and her siblings attended various youth
activities at the church. 10 2 While at church on Sunday evening, Laura
collapsed, not an uncommon occurrence at this church.10 3 Several church
members responded to Laura's collapse by praying for and "la[ying]
94. Id. at 404.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., McNichols, supra note 67, at 240-44 (discussing the various important
policy considerations in the strict products context); Roszkowski & Prentice, supra note 48,
23, 32-48 (explaining how it becomes too easy for courts to evade policy concerns after
adaptation of comparative fault principles).
97. 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
98. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
99. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6 (providing, in relevant part, "All men have a natural
and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences.... No human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or interfere
with the rights of conscience in matters of religion ...."); see also TEX. CONST. art I, § 29
("To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein delegated, we declare that
everything in this 'Bill of Rights' is excepted out of the general powers of government, and
shall forever remain inviolate, and all laws contrary thereto ... shall be void.").
100. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 2.
101. Id. at 3.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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hands" on her. 104 Laura complained that she did not welcome the church
members' actions and that several church members pinned her to the
ground and held her against her will for more than two hours over her
clear protestations. 105 She also claims that later that same day, church
members and staff physically restrained her for another hour,10 6 and did
so again three days later. 10 7 As a result of these events,
[Laura was plagued by] angry outbursts, weight loss, sleeplessness,
nightmares, hallucinations, self-mutilation, fear of abandonment, and
agoraphobia .... [She] became increasingly depressed and suicidal,
eventually dropping out of her senior year of high school and aban-
doning her former plan to attend Bible College and pursue mission-
ary work .... [She] was diagnosed as suffering from traumatic-stress
disorder, which the doctors associated with her physical restraint at
the church .... Ultimately, Laura was classified as disabled by the
Social Security Administration and began drawing a monthly disabil-
ity check. 108
The Schuberts left Pleasant Glade and began attending another
church.109
Laura and her parents sued the church, its pastor, its youth minister,
and several church members claiming, inter alia, negligence, gross negli-
gence, professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, false imprisonment, and assault. 110 Defendants unsuccessfully
sought to dismiss the lawsuit in the trial court, arguing that imposing lia-
bility would constitute an unconstitutional infringement of their religious
practices in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of both the Federal and
Texas Constitutions."' In a subsequent mandamus proceeding initiated
by the defendants, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals granted relief to the
defendants on the "religious" claims, which did not include Laura's
claims for assault and false imprisonment. 112 Instead, the assault and
false imprisonment claims were tried before a jury, which ruled in favor
of the plaintiff and awarded her $300,000 in damages for pain and suffer-
ing, loss of earning capacity, and medical expenses. 113 The defendants
appealed, again claiming that the verdict was in violation of their Free
Exercise rights under both the Federal and Texas Constitutions." 14
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed that part of the trial court's
damage award compensating for loss of earning capacity, but affirmed the
104. Id.
105. Id. at 15 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 4-5 (majority opinion).
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id.
112. In re Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 991 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1998, no pet.).
113. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 5.
114. Id. at 2, 6.
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rest of the judgment. 115 The court of appeals concluded that at this point
the defendants were judicially estopped from raising their First Amend-
ment claim because they allowed Laura's claim of assault, battery, and
false imprisonment to go forward in the previous mandamus proceed-
ing.116 The defendants again appealed and on petition for review-over
strong dissent-a majority of the Texas Supreme Court reversed and dis-
missed the case, holding that: (1) the defendants were not judicially es-
topped from asserting their defense; and (2) the defendants were entitled
to Free Exercise protection for the plaintiff's emotional damages, which
arose from defendants' "laying hands" on her to combat "evil forces."1
17
In its opinion, the majority first focused on the court of appeals's ruling
that the church defendants' failure to seek mandamus relief for Laura's
assault, battery, and false imprisonment claims resulted in judicial estop-
pel.118 The supreme court first explained that the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel, a procedural rule based on justice and public policy, is applied to
prevent a party from gaining an unfair advantage and applies only when a
party adopts a position inconsistent with a position maintained success-
fully at an earlier proceeding. 11 9 The majority explained that the court of
appeals improperly ruled that judicial estoppel applied here for at least
three reasons: (1) the alleged inconsistent position was asserted in the
same case rather than a prior proceeding, (2) the defendants did not gain
any advantage by its assertion, and (3) the defendants consistently as-
serted their First Amendment rights throughout.' 20 The supreme court
held that the procedural rule does not apply, and therefore, the defend-
ants were not estopped from asserting their First Amendment defense.
121
The majority next wrestled with the issue of the plaintiff's alleged dam-
ages for both physical pain and emotional injuries, and concluded that the
imposition of liability is indeed a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 122
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides for the free exer-
cise of one's religion, 23 and courts have consistently interpreted this to
mean that courts are prohibited from deciding issues of religious doc-
trine.1 24 As it concerns the facts in this case, Laura's claims are a combi-
115. Id.
116. Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 174 S.W.3d 388, 407 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2005), rev'd, 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
117. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 12-13.
118. Id. at 6-8.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 8.
122. See id. at 8-13.
123. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....").
124. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 11 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1976)). For an interesting discussion of the Free Exercise Clause, see
Vincent Phillip Munoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence
From the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1083 (2008), in which the author
argues that Free Exercise does not exempt religious institutions from generally applicable
laws that incidentally burden religious exercise.
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nation of both secular and religious claims. 125 The intentional tort claims
were based on the defendants' conduct during a common religious prac-
tice in their church.'2 6 Stripped of its religious co~ntext-that the touch-
ing and holding down were part of a religious practice-Laura would
have had viable claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment.
However, removing the religious context from the tortious conduct is
problematic. As the supreme court explained, "although Laura's secular
injury claims might theoretically be tried without mentioning religion, the
imposition of tort liability for engaging in religious activity to which the
church members adhere would have an unconstitutional 'chilling effect'
by compelling the church to abandon core principles of its religious be-
liefs" and would violate the Free Exercise Clause. 127 Moreover, the man-
ner in which the trial court permitted imposition of damages complicated
things even further. The damages awarded for the commission of these
torts sought to compensate the plaintiff for both mental and physical inju-
ries. 128 Divorcing the physical consequences from the mental conse-
quences would prove much too difficult2 29 This was problematic because
Laura's emotional injuries caused by, what turned out to be, a negative
religious experience were inextricably intertwined with her non-religious
or secular injuries caused by the tortious conduct. 130 The supreme court
explained that the laying on of hands, and the mental trauma associated
with it, are part of the church's belief system. 131 "[C]ourts must carefully
scrutinize the circumstances so as not to become entangled in a religious
dispute."'1 32 Accordingly, Laura had "failed to state a cognizable, secular
claim" distinct from the religious claim, and consequently, imposing lia-
bility would be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 133 The supreme
court therefore reversed and dismissed the intentional tort claims for
want of jurisdiction.13 4
Chief Justice Jefferson, joined by Justices Green and Johnson, dis-
sented.' 35 Chief Justice Jefferson complained that the majority had fash-
ioned a rule by which a "tortfeasor need merely allege a religious motive
to deprive a Texas court of jurisdiction to compensate his fellow congre-
gant for emotional damages. ' 136 Chief Justice Jefferson further com-
plained that the majority's opinion was based on a flawed understanding
or interpretation of the Free Exercise doctrine, explaining that the First
Amendment "does not sanction intentional abuse in religion's name."'1 37
125. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 7.
126. Id. at 10-11.
127. Id. at 10 (citing Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 400 (Tex. 2007)).




132. Id. at 12.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id.





The dissenting justices puzzled over the majority's application of judi-
cial estoppel, inasmuch as the church defendants had previously con-
ceded that the assault, battery, and false imprisonment claims presented a
secular rather than a religious controversy. 138 The dissenting justices
went on to explain that this case presents secular intentional tort claims at
its core. 139 Agreeing that the First Amendment forbids courts to become
embroiled in an assessment of the propriety of religious beliefs or doc-
trine, the dissenters emphasized that awarding damages for physical inju-
ries arising from assault, battery, or false imprisonment does not require
proof of emotional or mental injuries. 140 In fact, the intentional torts of
assault, battery, and false imprisonment do not require a showing of
mental damages at all. 141 Therefore, in this case, if Laura could estab-
lish-as she did-that she suffered physical injuries separate and distinct
from her emotional injuries as part of her assault, battery, and false im-
prisonment claims, permitting her recovery for those physical injuries
would not be in violation of the church defendants' First Amendment
rights. 142 The First Amendment "never has immunized clergy or
churches from all causes of action alleging tortuous conduct ..... '[A]
church may be held liable for intentional tortious conduct on behalf of its
officers or members, even if that conduct is carried out as part of the
Church's religious practices.' 1 43 At trial, the jury was not permitted to
hear about the religious beliefs or doctrines of the church defendants or
the plaintiff.144 Instead, it assigned liability to the defendants based on
the commission of battery, assault, and false imprisonment claims without
considering, or even being informed of, the church defendants' beliefs.145
That the jury was asked to provide one figure for the plaintiff's mental as
well as physical injuries should not preclude the plaintiff from being able
to recover for her physical injuries stemming from the battery, assault,
and false imprisonment claims.146
All three dissenting justices-Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Green,
and Justice Johnson-agreed that the defendants should not be afforded
First Amendment protection for the plaintiff's battery, assault, and false
imprisonment claims. They disagree, however, on how a plaintiff's allow-
able physical injury damages could be separated from those prohibited by
138. Id. at 13-14. In its successful writ of mandamus, the church abandoned its First
Amendment claims for those intentional torts, explaining that "no church or pastor can use
the First Amendment as an excuse to cause bodily injury to any person." Id.
139. Id. at 15.
140. Id. at 15-16, 17-18.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 17 (quoting Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 677 (Tex. 1996)).
144. Id. at 18.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 20 ("constitutional protection for illegal or tortuous conduct cannot be boot-
strapped from the protection of beliefs where it does not otherwise exist"). Rather than
allow defendants to shield themselves from liability based on the Free Exercise Clause, the
dissenters propose that a more appropriate defense may be the plaintiff's consent. Id. at
20, 23 n.1. Consent is a fact issue that must be determined by the jury. Id. at 20.
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the First Amendment. On the one hand, Chief Justice Jefferson and Jus-
tice Green suggest that defendants' First Amendment assertion should be
an affirmative defense that must be raised by defendants at trial. 147 If so,
the trial court could then conduct the proceedings without reference to
religion and include a proximate cause instruction on foreseeability. 148
The jury would then be asked to assess only those damages reasonably
connected to the secular injury.149 In addition to joining Chief Justice
Jefferson's opinion, Justice Green also writes separately simply adding
that "[i]f a plaintiff's case can be made without relying on religious doc-
trine, the defendant must be required to respond in kind.' 150 Justice
Johnson also dissents separately, indicating that in order to prevent im-
proper entanglement of First Amendment issues, he would "preclude
damages for those emotional injuries for which there is any evidence of
causation by religious beliefs or teachings."' 15
However, unlike Chief Justice Jefferson and Justice Green, Justice
Johnson would not make that preclusion an affirmative defense. Rather,
according to Justice Johnson, "whether alleged mental and emotional
damages resulted to any degree from religious beliefs and teachings
should be determined by the trial court as a matter of law."'1 52 Any evi-
dence regarding religious practices or beliefs could then be precluded by
motions in limine or pretrial hearings, as was done in this case.' 53 The
trial court could then submit separate damages questions isolating emo-
tional or psychological injuries, thereby divorcing the First Amendment
damages from all other types of damages. 154
Of course, the issue of tort recovery for the injured and the protection
of churches based on the Free Exercise Clause is a complex issue. A
workable balance needs to be struck. The dissenting justices take the first
step at trying to unravel the competing issues at play and arrive at a
workable solution. It cannot be denied that the dissenting justices have
expressed legitimate concerns, particularly their concern that tortfeasors
can avoid liability by alleging a Free Exercise claim. Chief Justice Jeffer-
son's proposal to present separate damages questions seems to be a work-
able solution. It is not unfamiliar for Texas courts to present multiple
issues to a jury. Certainly, such a system would work here, and the result
could be that Texas would afford church defendants the protection of
their Free Exercise rights while at the same time permit persons injured
by their tortious conduct to receive compensation for their secular
injuries.
147. Id. at 21.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 21-22.
150. Id. at 23 (Green, J., dissenting).







Going forward, these recent Texas Supreme Court decisions will im-
pact Texas tort practice. As a consequence of Ledesma, changes will be
made to Texas's pattern jury charge in products liability actions in order
to refine the proper definitions of "manufacturing defect" and "produc-
ing cause. 1 55 As a consequence of the opinions in JCW Electronics, the
language used in instructing juries to compare fault in products cases pur-
suant to Chapter 33 will hopefully change in an effort to clarify that the
jury is being asked to compare the fault of the parties, not just the negli-
gence of the parties. 156 As a consequence of New Texas Auto Services,
L.P., Texas law going forward is clear that an auctioneer is not a party
who may be held liable for injury caused as a result of a defective prod-
uct. 157 Finally, as a consequence of the various opinions issued in Pleas-
ant Glade Assembly of God, the debate regarding the liability of church
defendants engaging in intentional tortious behavior in Texas may con-
tinue to develop in a thoughtful and workable manner.158
155. See supra Part II.A (discussing Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32 (Tex.
2007)).
156. See supra Part II.B (discussing JCW Elects., Inc. v. Garza, 257 S.W.3d 701 (Tex.
2008)).
157. See supra Part II.C (discussing New Tex. Auto Servs., L.P. v. Gomez de Her-
nandez, 248 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2008)).
158. See supra Part III (discussing Schubert, 264 S.W.3d at 1).
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